1 Sider rules this out on the grounds that it conflicts with his thesis (7.12) that 'no special-purpose vocabulary that is distinctive of indeterminacy carves at the joints', and 'fundamental languages obey classical logic'. I see no conflict here. However, vagueness in 'structural' would be hard to combine with Sider's thesis (7.13) that structural is structural. For further discussion see §4 of Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne, 'Naturalness' (forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol. 8, ed. Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman).
viously justified beliefs about structure. For example, here are three pairs that we clearly need to find a way to count as bad:
(i) Suppose T is some state-of-the-art physical theory expressed in terms of some concepts P one of which is mass-or to be precise, the two-place predicate 'the rest mass of x in Planck units is n'. Let me introduce the concept mass* by stipulating that whenever an object's mass is n, its mass* is 17 √n. Let P 1 and T 1 be the results of replacing 'mass' in P and T with 'mass*'. (Note that T 1 is inconsistent with T: e.g. if T says (truly) that the ratio of the mass of the proton to that of the electron is 1836, T 1 will say (falsely) that the ratio of the mass* of the proton to the mass* of the electron is 1836 . )
(ii) Let 'Q' abbreviate some true sentence not entailed by T-e.g. 'the moon and the sun look approximately the same size from Earth'. Let me introduce the concept Q-mass by stipulating that for any object x and real number n, n is the Q-mass of x iff either Q and n is the mass of x, or not-Q and n is zero. Let P 2 and T 2 be the results of replacing 'mass' in P and T with 'Q-mass'.
(iii) Let me introduce the concept T-friendliness by stipulating that for any object x, x is T-friendly iff T is true. Let P 3 consist of standard logical vocabulary together with 'Tfriendly', and let T 3 be the sentence '∃x(x is T-friendly)' together with its consequences in first-order logic.
If we know anything at all about structure, we know that mass*, Q-mass and Tfriendliness are not structural. So 〈P 1 ,T 1 〉, 〈P 2 ,T 2 〉 and 〈P 3 ,T 3 〉 had better be considerably worse than the best 〈ideology, theory〉 pairs. But it is not obvious how to understand the notion of goodness in such a way as to distinguish these pairs from 〈P,T〉, which is presumably quite good by Sider's lights. Considerations of syntactic simplicity will not help, since T 1 and T 2 are both syntactically isomorphic to T, while T 3 is syntactically ultra-simple. And considerations like familiarity and ease of use can hardly be relevant, since they would count heavily against the austere, physics-and-mathematics-based !pairs that Sider favours. We need to take something else into account. What could it be?
One tempting idea is to attribute the badness of 〈P 1 ,T 1 〉 and 〈P 2 ,T 2 〉 to the fact that mass* and Q-mass are, in fact, much less natural than mass. Because of this, the propositions expressed by T 1 and T 2 are, plausibly, much less natural than the one expressed by T. 2 And Sider's discussion of the role of structure in inductive epistemology ( §3.3) suggests that this difference is significant-simpler explanations of our evidence are ceteris paribus more worthy of belief, and the degree of naturalness of a proposition is closely connected to its degree of simplicity.
But the best-pair methodology would lose its point if goodness had to be understood in terms of facts about what is structural/natural. If we want to use the methodology in giving non-question-begging arguments for conclusions about structuralness (and Sider certainly does), we need to be able to make comparisons of theoretical merit with some confidence even when we are still unsure what is structural-otherwise, the methodology will be unusable in the same way as the advice 'believe the truth'. Our assessment of the goodness of an 〈I,T I 〉 pair must thus somehow prescind from the question how natural the concepts in I actually are. If we want to appeal to some notion of explanatory satisfaction, our question must be something like 'How satisfying an explanation of the phenomena would T I provide if the structural concepts were those in I? '. 3 (In fact I see no easy way to reconcile the best-pair methodology with the putative epistemological role of naturalness. Since that role relates the facts about what it is rational to believe to the facts about how natural certain properties or propositions actually are, it suggests that when we are uncertain about naturalness, we should normally be uncertain what rationality requires. By contrast, according to the best-pair method-
One idea worth exploring is that 〈P,T〉 might be superior because it does a better job of explaining the known fact that 'mass' refers to mass. Let us see how this might play out in the comparison with 〈P 1 ,T 1 〉. Structural meanings are easy to refer to; so if the structural concepts were those in P, it would not be surprising that physicists should have a word referring to mass. On the other hand, if the structural concepts were those in P 1 , mass would be a rather unnatural quantity (mass* to the 17th power), making the fact that physicists introduced a word for mass quite remarkable. 5
In evaluating the suggestion that the required discriminations among 〈I,T I 〉 pairs can be attributed to differences in their capacities to explain facts about reference, we need
tory merit in a way that somehow abstracts from considerations of cognitive accessibility. What then is the relevant difference between facts about reference and economic facts, such that the need to explain the former justifies expanding our ideology beyond that of physics while the need to explain the latter does not? Sider addresses this question in §7.13. As I understand it, the response is that if Sider is right about the list of structural concepts, the concepts of the special sciences are not 'highly disjunctive', and are thus explanatorily useful, so that the list can garner some credit for the explanatory successes of those sciences. By contrast, if structure is not structural, it is 'highly disjunctive', and therefore explanatorily impotent. This argument raises many more questions than I can address here. 6 Here is one worry: if the denial that structure is structural entails that structure is highly disjunctive, it plausibly also entails that reference, similarity, and lawhood are highly disjunctive in the same sense; and whatever truth there may be in the idea that highly disjunctive concepts are explanatorily impotent, it is hard to see how there could be anything wrong with invoking a highly disjunctive concept in explaining a phenomenon that is itself highly disjunctive.
Fortunately, we do not need to decide whether structure is structural in order to accept the present suggestion that the belief that mass rather than mass* is structural is justified by its role in explaining why 'mass' refers to mass rather than mass*. Can this strategy be generalised to 〈P 2 ,T 2 〉 and 〈P 3 ,T 3 〉? It is difficult to say, since Sider's discussion of comparative naturalness ( §7.11.1) does not suggest any straightforward way to answer the question how natural mass would be if the structural concepts were those in P 2 or P 3 . For example, it is unclear how to apply the Lewisian thought that a concept's degree of naturalness depends on the simplicity of its definition in structural termsmass cannot in any intuitive sense be 'defined' in terms of the concepts in P 2 or P 3 , and
Sider gives no further account of the relevant notion of 'definition'.
!A different strategy for explaining why we can reasonably dismiss the hypotheses that the structural concepts are those in P 2 and P 3 is to appeal to something like Lewis's principle that 'truth supervenes on being'-e.g. the claim that all facts supervene on facts expressible in structural terms. Since it seems obvious that there are many factsabout mass, for example-that do not supervene on facts expressible using P 2 or P 3 , such a principle could be used to rule out these candidate lists of structural concepts.
(One could integrate this with the best-pair methodology by including facts of nonsupervenience among the 'phenomena' to be explained.) But Sider is not well-placed to endorse this argument: one central theme of the chapter on modality is that we should, in general, resist arguments against theories about structure which are based on modal intuitions. 7 And he needs to take this attitude, since a methodology that accords more weight to modal intuitions will tend to undermine Sider's favoured short, mathematicsand-physics-driven list of structural concepts: many of us intuit that two things could fail to be duplicates even though no predicate of actual-world mathematics or physics applies to either.
The claim that everything supervenes on the structural is one way to precisify the slogan 'the structural is complete'. Sider prefers a different precisification: the demand that 'every language has a metaphysical semantics', in which 'meanings are to be given in purely joint-carving terms' ( §7.4). For a non-context-sensitive and purely 'factual' language, a metaphysical semantics takes the form of a theory which includes, for each sentence S, a theorem 'S is true in L iff $', where $ is constructed out of structural expressions. Can this demand take over the dialectical work that we wanted to get out of the supervenience principle, by allowing us to rule out the likes of P 2 and P 3 as candidates to be the set of structural concepts? I find it hard to say, because Sider says little ! 8
7 Sider argues that this attitude towards modal arguments follows from his favoured 'Humean' view of modality: modal intuition cannot 'be regarded as probative in matters of fundamental metaphysics' unless it is 'somehow probative concerning the actual falsity of rivals; but then there would be no need to bring in possibility; one could argue directly against the rivals' (p.278). But even if the Humean view is true, why couldn't the most effective argument for a nonmodal conclusion have modal premises?
